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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of applying gender quotas on policy decisions. I first examine the effect 
of gender quotas on the representation of female legislators, study the correlation between gender quotas 
and different types of government expenditures, and then use quotas as an instrument for the proportion 
of female legislators to investigate the effect of female legislators on policy outcomes. The results show 
that an increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of 
government expenditure on health and social welfare to GDP by 0.18 and 0.67 percentage points, 
respectively. The robustness check supports that the effect of quotas on female legislators is likely to be 
translated into the influence of female policymakers on social welfare. 
JEL-codes: D78, H50, J16. 
Keywords: female legislator, gender quotas, policy outcomes. 
1. Introduction 
An increasing number of countries are currently introducing various types of 
gender quotas in public elections to reach a gender balance in political institutions. Most 
developing countries introduced electoral gender quotas during the 1990s, mainly due to 
the influence of the UN Conference on Women held in Beijing.
2 On the other hand, 
most developed countries adopted gender quotas 10 or 15 years prior to the 
Conference. A dramatic change has taken place in the established rank order of 
countries regarding the level of women’s political representation. The five Nordic 
countries, which for many years were almost alone at the top of the list, are now being 
challenged by amazingly fast development in a number of countries around the globe. 
For example, Rwanda superseded Sweden as number one in the world in terms of 
women’s parliamentary representation - 48.8% women against Sweden’s 45.3% in 2003, 
and has more than 50% of seats for female legislators since 2008. 
The core idea behind the gender quota systems is to recruit women into political 
positions and to ensure that women are not isolated in political life. The evidence 
suggests that women tend to have systematically different preferences for household 
spending. The incorporation of women’s concerns in decision-making would, thereby, 
improve the nature of the public sphere. In addition, women’s representation can also 
have an indirect influence by increasing men’s attention to policies concerning women 
                                                 
1 Department of Economics, Feng Chia University, 40724 Taichung, Taiwan. I thank Professor Per 
Pettersson-Lidbom for his advice and support. E-mail: chenlj@fcu.edu.tw. The author are grateful to an 
anonymous referee and editors for their invaluable comments but all remaining errors are my own. 
2 In response to mandates made at the Beijing UN Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, greater 
advances were made with respect to governmental institutionalization for the promotion of women’s 
rights in developing countries.  
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and children.
3 Quota systems therefore aim at ensuring that women constitute a certain 
number or percentage of the members of a body, whether it is a candidate list, a 
parliamentary assembly, a committee, or a government. 
Theoretically, if the candidates do not commit to implement specific policies once 
elected, the identity of the legislator matters for policy determination (Besley and Coate, 
1997, and Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). This influence on policy increases as there is 
increasing political representation of a group. Therefore, if gender quota systems lead to 
a pronounced increase in women’s representation in politics, we should observe that 
government gives higher weights to policy outcomes related to women’s concerns after 
introducing a gender quota system. 
However, existing empirical studies focus on the effect of political reservations on 
policy outcomes in the case of an individual country.
4 Do quotas work as well in 
general? Some countries take gender quotas as a symbolic policy to reflect the demand 
for gender equality without making related changes in institutions. The use of quotas is 
thereby not sufficient to ensure high levels of women in parliament.
5 On the other hand, 
a high level of representation might be achieved without quotas, such as that achieved in 
Nordic countries. I therefore first investigate the effect of quotas on the representation 
of women in parliament. Taking the introduction of quotas as an exogenous source of 
variation, I can thereby compare women’s representation before and after the policy is 
applied. 
I then examine government spending on different functions before and after the 
introduction of quotas to check whether political reservations have increased 
expenditures on groups that should benefit from the mandate. Under the assumption 
that gender quotas have neither a direct impact on policy outcomes nor an influence on 
policy outcomes through channels other than the proportion of female legislators, I use 
gender quotas as an instrument for female legislators and study the effect of female 
legislators on policy outcomes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background of women’s preference and gender quota systems adopted around the 
world. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and data collection. Section 4 presents 
the results of the analysis. Section 5 provides robustness checks and section 6 
concludes. 
                                                 
3 According to the “critical mass” argument (Kanter (1977)), the influence from female legislators on 
policy decisions is not negligible when there is a significant presence of women in the legislature. 
4 See, for example, Pande (2003) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). Both of these studies investigate 
the effect of female legislators on policy outcomes in India, and state that the role of political 
reservations for women provides disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. 
5 See Dahlerup (2006). Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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2. Backgrounds 
2.1 Women’s preference 
What concerns women? Edlund and Pande (2002) argue that the traditional 
division of labor between men and women results in different preferences between 
women and men. Women tend to purchase goods for children and for general 
household consumption because they have default rights to children conventionally. 
Men, on other hand, get part of the right only if they sign a contract for marriage where 
they promise to provide for their wife and children. However, the rise in the divorce 
rate, delayed marriage, non-marital fertility and cohabitation in recent decades is 
suggested to lead women to prefer redistribution policies since the obligation to provide 
for the family no longer rests solely on the husband.
6 Women may therefore favor those 
policies related to children and family, such as education, health, and welfare issues, 
more than men when they participate in the decision-making process. However, there is 
nothing normative about this kind of model. 
2.2 What are quotas? 
Quotas for women are a form of affirmative action to help them overcome the 
obstacles that prevent them from entering politics in the same way as their male 
colleagues. There are different types of quotas. According to the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the main distinction 
based on the mandating is between voluntary party quotas and legal gender quotas.
7 
Voluntary party quotas are adopted by political parties, and are set by the parties 
themselves to guarantee the nomination of a certain number or proportion of women. 
On the other hand, legal gender quotas are mandated either by the constitution or by 
the electoral law, obliging all political entities participating in elections to apply them 
equally.
8 Although non-compliance with legislative or constitutional quotas can result in 
penalties for those political entities that do not apply them, it is not at all evident that 
legal gender quotas are more efficient than political party quotas in increasing the 
number of women in parliament.
9 The effectiveness of legal quotas depends on the 
actual rules and the possible sanctions for non-compliance, as well as on the general 
crucial issue like whether there is any rule considering the rank order of women 
candidates on the ballot. Additionally, legal quotas may be introduced after a heated 
                                                 
6 See Edlund, Haider, and Pande (2005). 
7 See the website of IDEA, http://www.quotaproject.org/. In each type of gender quota system, quotas 
may target the first stage of the selection process, i.e., the stage of finding aspirants, the second stage of 
the actual nomination of candidates to be placed on the ballot by the party, and the third stage of 
reserved seats for women. This study only considers whether a quota system is introduced in a country, 
and who has mandated the quota system. 
8 For example, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Uganda have adopted constitutional quotas, and many countries 
in Latin America have adopted legislative quotas. 
9 Examples of sanctions issued by the legal authorities of a country can range from disqualifying 
candidates to the imposition of fines, and can include the disqualification of the entire party. See 
“Designing for Equality”, published by IDEA in 2007.  
EJCE, vol.7, n.1 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
16 
debate, but then have no effect on increasing women’s representation because there are 
no mechanisms to ensure their implementation. 
2.3 The world of quotas 
Dahlerup (2006) defines two different tracks to equal political representation for 
women and men, which are the incremental track and the fast track. While the 
incremental track, such as what is used in Scandinavia, rests on a gradual increase in 
women’s overall resources and on gradual historical changes in the perceptions of 
womanhood, the fast track represents a historical leap forward in women’s 
representation, such as those used in Latin America and Africa. 
It took approximately 60 years for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to exceed the 
20% threshold, and 70 years to reach 30% female representation in parliament.
10 
However, quotas were not introduced among these countries until women had already 
reached about 25% of the seats in 1980s, which was, at that time, also the highest 
proportions in the world. Quotas are not only for minimum requirements, but also for 
gender balance in this area. Similar tracks can be found within other developed 
countries in Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand.
11 In all 
countries, these policies originated with women in civil society and inside the political 
parties, who presented gender quotas as a way to win support among female voters.
12 
In contrast, the fast track method is a common situation among developing 
countries because women do not have the same political resources as men. Therefore, 
the responsibility for dealing with the under-representation of women rests with the 
political institutions. In line with this conception of women’s under-representation, 
mandated quotas for the recruitment and election of female candidates are needed. In 
1990 the UN Economic and Social Council endorsed a target of 30% women in 
decision-making positions in the world by 1995. However, in 1995, only 10% of the 
world’s parliamentary members were women. The Beijing Platform in 1995, on the 
other hand, has been very influential, and women’s movements all over the world have 
attempted to give the controversial demand for gender quotas legitimacy by referring to 
the Platform for Action. 
Latin America is the leading continent when it comes to the introduction of 
gender quotas in politics after the Beijing Platform.
13 All countries adopted them 
between 1996 and 2000, with the exception of Argentina, which acted earlier in 1991. 
Since economic reforms during the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s 
aiming at reduced public spending had a significantly negative impact on women’s living 
conditions, the epicenter of Latin American women’s struggles was the process of re-
democratization, strategically focused on enforcing their rights as women and as citizens 
in the political and social dimensions. Africa is another continent with countries 
                                                 
10 See Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie (2006). 
11 See Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires (2006). 
12 A new party may adopt gender quotas when seeking to establish an initial basis of support, while an 
existing party may adopt it for aiming to overcome a string of electoral losses. 
13 See Araújo and García (2006). Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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introducing gender quotas mostly after 1995.
14 There has been perhaps a greater reliance 
on constitutionally mandated reserved seats in Africa compared with other regions in 
the world. This may reflect a greater concern for guaranteed outcomes in terms of 
female representation and a lack of confidence in party compliance or initiative. 
Other regions in the world are without a clear categorization of track. Countries in 
the Balkans did not allow questions regarding gender equality and political participation 
of women to be raised in any of the respective countries in early 1990s, during the 
transitional period.
15 Gender quotas were gradually accepted within the parties in these 
areas after the release of the Beijing Platform for Action. The Arab region is another 
without clear categorization.
16 Arab societies use all possible means to entrench their 
value-based heritage, by promoting customs and traditions that curb women’s activities 
and confine their existence to the framework of the family. Therefore, the majority of 
Arab countries do not apply gender quotas. 
In sum, to elect women by the fast track may lead to rapid results with regard to 
the representation of women in politics, but the effect on policy outcomes may not be 
clear if these women legislators are elected with no power base in their party, civic 
organizations, or constituencies. Therefore, it would be more convincing to examine 
whether the quota system influences policies by including as many countries as possible 
and also considering countries with both the fast track and the incremental track. 
3. Empirical strategy and data 
3.1 Empirical strategy 
I apply a Difference-in-Difference approach to investigate the effect of gender 
quota systems. I collect two observations for each variable in each country, one before 
and the other one after the introduction of gender quotas. These two time-points are 
distant from each other for the purpose of looking at the long term impact of quotas on 
female legislators and on policy outcomes. If the time-points are too close to each other, 
say, a 5-year difference, there may be negligible change in the government budget and 
no change of the representation of women in politics due to the same election period.
17 
Moreover, gender quotas may not have an immediate political impact.
18 Using this 
approach I study whether gender quotas influence women’s representation in politics, 
                                                 
14 See Tripp, Konaté, and Lowe-Morna (2006). 
15 See Antić and Lokar (2006). 
16 See Abou-Zeid (2006). 
17 Wooldridge (2002) points out that while independent variables frequently have substantial variation in 
the cross section for each time point, their first difference may not have much variation, which can lead 
to a large standard error for the estimates when estimating by OLS. This problem can be solved by 
using a large cross section, or by using longer differences over time. In this paper, I use the long-
difference regression and include as many countries as possible, depending on the availability of data. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) adopt the same approach. 
18 The effect of gender quotas on the level of female legislators in the fast track may be the only 
exception.  
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and also examine whether there is correlation between the variation of government 
expenditures in different policy outcomes and gender quotas. 
I consider the following empirical specifications: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i Quotas FEM , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ε δ γ β α + Χ + + + =      (1) 
 
t i t i t i t i t i Quotas EXP , , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , ε δ γ β α + Χ + + + =      (2) 
 
where i denotes country indices and t denotes time indices. Quotas is a binary 
indicator, denoting whether the country applies gender quotas.  1 = Quotas  corresponds 
to the introduction of quota system, and  0 = Quotas , otherwise. FEM  denotes the 
proportion of women in the lower chamber and EXP denotes policy outcomes.  i α  
denotes the country fixed effect, which controls for unobserved permanent differences 
in the dependent variables. Similarly,  t β  captures the post-effect of gender quotas on 
the dependent variables.  t i, Χ  is a set of control variables, such as real GDP per capita 
and year. Real GDP per capita is included because it is suggested that countries with 
better economic conditions may be more likely to adopt gender quotas and/or have 
more women in politics. I control for year, which captures the influence of duration 
between two observations in individual country after the first difference, since sampling 
occurred in different years for different countries.
19 In addition, I am concerned about 
the non-linear trend of the proportion of female legislators, i.e., female representation 
may increase enormously after the introduction of gender quotas. Thereafter, I control 
for the quadratic term of duration after the first difference.
20 
Under the assumption that gender quotas have neither direct impact on policy 
outcomes nor influence on policy outcomes through channels other than the fraction of 
female legislators, gender quotas are a valid instrument for the proportion of female 
legislators and can be used to study the effect of female legislators on policy outcomes. 
The empirical specification is as following: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i d rFEM b a EXP , , , , ς + Χ + + + =       (3) 
 
                                                 
19 For example, the beginning and ending year for Argentina are 1976 and 2004, respectively. I include 
these controls in equation (1) and equation (2). The duration for Argentina is therefore 24 years. 
20 Equation (1)-(3) represent the equations before the first difference. Country dummies are removed 
from equation (1)-(3) after the first difference, and will not sacrifice the degree of freedom in the 
difference-in-difference approach. In addition, the year variable refers to the number of year, instead of 
year dummies, and will capture the influence of duration after the first difference. Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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where  i a  reflects country dummies and  t b  reflects the post-effect of gender 
quotas. According to Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), the estimate of the average effect 
is the ratio between the reduced form effect to the effect at the first stage, i.e., 
1
2
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
γ
γ
= r . 
3.2 Data description 
The dataset used here includes 103 countries between 1970 and 2006, which 
contains 22 countries with legal gender quotas, 47 countries with voluntary party quotas 
and 43 countries without any type of gender quotas. Most developed countries 
introduced gender quotas in the 1980s, while most developing countries adopted gender 
quotas in the 1990s. The data for the existence of gender quotas are collected from 
International IDEA, and are reported in Table 1.
21 For the countries that introduced any 
type of gender quotas, the variable Quotas takes a value of 1 in the year when it was 
firstly introduced. For voluntary party quotas, the variable Quotas takes a value of 1 in 
the year when the first political party applied gender quotas.
22 I then collect comparable 
data on other variables based on Quotas. 
The measure of female involvement in politics mainly comes from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union’s survey, Women in Parliaments: 1945-1995.
23 This publication lists 
the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women in each country. I only consider 
women’s representation in the lower chamber.
24 Furthermore, policy outcomes refer to 
consolidated central government expenditures on general public service, defense, health, 
education, housing, economic affairs, and social services and welfare.
25 They are 
reported in Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook issued by the IMF. I divide these 
values by the GDP and multiply the result by 100. 
Table 2 provides the details of these expenses provided by the Government Finance 
Statistics Manual 2001. Based on the survey by political scientists, female legislators tend 
to focus on legislation dealing with issues related to traditional concerns of women.
26 
Therefore, I would expect to see a positive effect of female legislators on education, 
health, and social welfare since they are categories related to children and the family. 
                                                 
21 The website of International IDEA provides information about the type of gender quota system 
adopted, political party adopting quotas, and the year of adoption for each country. 
22 I categorize countries that have applied any type of quotas, but later abolished them, in the QG by 
assuming a continuous effect of gender quotas. For example, Denmark applied party quotas between 
1977 and 1996, and legal quotas between 1988 and 1990. Other such cases are: Egypt, which applied 
legal quotas between 1979 and 1986; Italy, which applied legal quotas between 1993 and 1997; and 
Venezuela, which applied legal quotas between 1997 and 2000. 
23 The series after 1995 are collected from the website of IPU. 
24 I employ the data of women’s representation in the lower chamber because the election results do not 
appear in the upper chamber for some countries with a bicameral system, such as in Canada. 
25 I consider only those categories that exist continuously during the sample periods, including total 
government spending. Other items, such as public order and safety, environment protection, recreation, 
and culture and religion, are not considered because they are either not defined in the early period or 
not reported for most of the countries. 
26 For example, see Thomas (1994), Davis (1997), Wängenrud (2000), and Schwindt-Bayer (2007).  
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Moreover, women are less likely to support government expenditures on defense, and 
may exert a negative influence on such expenditures given the need for budget balance.
27 
However, the directions of the signs of women’s influence on general public service, 
housing, and economic affairs are not clear. 
4. Results 
4.1 Quotas v.s. female legislators 
Table 3 provides mean percentage points of women’s representation in politics 
and expenditures on policy outcomes to GDP before and after applying gender quotas. 
There are only small differences in the mean proportion of female legislators among 
countries before the introduction of quotas. The female proportion prior to quota 
system is 6.24% for the quota group (QG, henceforth) and 6.23% for the non-quota 
group (NQG, henceforth) including OECD countries, while it is 5.82% for the QG and 
5.98% for the NQG without OECD countries.
28 Even though the number of women in 
politics grows over time, there exist differences between groups after the treatment. The 
average level of female legislators for the QG is about 1.52 times as large as that for the 
NQG including OECD countries, and it is about 1.31 times larger in the QG than in 
the NQG when OECD countries are excluded. Therefore, gender quotas are very likely 
to explain the growing participation of women in politics. 
Nevertheless, there is concern about the endogeneity problem of introducing 
gender quotas, which would result in selection bias. It is suggested that countries 
adopting gender quotas may be also countries with higher GDP per capita and/or with 
more social concerns. Although the figure with the change in the proportion of female 
legislators on x-axis and the change in real GDP per capita on y-axis shows a positive 
correlation, it does not seem to be driven by certain groups of countries.
29 (I will deal 
with this issue more by econometrics in Section 5.) Moreover, does a country’s choice 
of quota type relate to economic growth since most of the traditional OECD countries 
introduced voluntary party quotas and most of the developing countries introduced legal 
gender quotas? It suggests that a country’s choice of a quota system is not biased 
according to economic growth.
30 
                                                 
27 Davis (1997) points out that women never held positions in the sector of defense in government 
between 1968 and 1992 in Western European countries. 
28 OECD refers to Northern and Western European countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States. I only consider these countries as OECD countries for the purpose of controlling their 
similar historical socio-economic background, which may have effect on women’s representation in 
politics and on policy outcomes. Moreover, it is also for the purpose of matching countries with the 
incremental track as defined by Dahlerup (2006). 
29 The figure is available on request. Moreover, the correlation line may become a bit flatter by dropping 
those countries with an increasing proportion of female legislators of more than 25%, such as Austria, 
Belgium, Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain. Or, it may be a bit steeper if Hungary and 
Zimbabwe are excluded. No matter the case, the correlation line would not be influenced very much. 
30 The figures show that on average most countries have an economic growth rate around 0-1% and an 
increasing proportion of female legislators of around 0-30% during the sample period, no matter which 
type of gender quota system is introduced. The figures are available on request. Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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The effect of gender quotas on the proportion of female legislators, which is 
estimated by equation (1), is reported in Table 4. Here I include all countries. There is a 
significant positive effect of gender quotas on the share of female legislators. In general, 
the proportion of female legislators in the QG after adopting gender quotas is 5.03 
percentage points higher than that in the NQG. I then investigate the effect of gender 
quotas considering the types of systems and present the results in column (2). Voluntary 
party quotas, relative to legal gender quotas, seem to be more relevant to the 
representation of women in politics. Since political parties adopt voluntary party quotas 
voluntarily, it is less likely that quotas will be a symbolic policy. In addition, electoral 
campaigns may strengthen the effect of voluntary party quotas on women’s 
representation in politics since political parties without quotas may feel forced to 
nominate more women. On average, the proportion of female legislators in countries 
with voluntary party quotas is 4.18 percentage points higher than that in countries 
without party quotas. 
4.2 Quotas v.s. policy outcomes 
Do gender quotas influence policy outcomes? In Table 3, the mean percentage of 
GDP for expenditures on health, education, and social welfare, which are categories 
suggested to be women’s concerns, are mostly increasing over time whether or not 
OECD countries are included. Even though expenditures on health are lower for the 
QG before gender quotas are applied, it is 1.35 times larger than the expenditures for 
the NQG after the treatment. The same pattern emerges in spending on education; 
spending for the NQG is higher than that for the QG before the treatment, but it 
increases at a faster rate for the QG after the treatment. For the expenditures on social 
welfare, there is a more pronounced rise of its share of GDP within the QG.
31 There is 
also an increase in expenditures for general public service, and decreased spending on 
defense and economic affairs. The average share of expenditures on housing increases 
for non-OECD countries, but the pattern is not clear when OECD countries are taken 
into account. In addition, there is no consistent trend for total government spending. 
An estimation of equation (2) including all countries is reported in Table 4. The 
results given in column (1) show that gender quotas are only relevant to social service 
and welfare among policy outcomes. On average, countries, after introducing gender 
quotas, tend to spend 3.38 percentage points more on social welfare than those 
countries without gender quotas. Even though the coefficients are not significant, 
gender quotas are also positively correlated with other policy outcomes that concern 
women, such as health and education. Column (2) provides the results considering the 
types of gender quota systems. Voluntary party quotas are relevant to social welfare that 
the share of government expenditures on social welfare is 3.55 percentage points higher 
in countries adopting voluntary party quotas than that in countries without party quotas. 
Since voluntary party quotas are usually 1) adopted first; 2) mostly by left-wing parties, 
which have been suggested to prefer policies about social welfare more than right-wing 
parties; and 3) are more relevant to the representation of female legislators, who are 
                                                 
31 Even though the average proportion of expenditures on social welfare for countries with legal quotas 
is less than that for the NQG after the treatment, the growth rate is 74% for the QG and only 20% for 
the NQG.  
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more likely to give priority to legislation reflecting women’s preferences, it may explain 
the effectiveness of party quotas on government expenditures on social welfare.
32 
4.3 Female legislators v.s. policy outcomes 
Although there is a reduced form effect of gender quotas on government 
expenditures on social welfare, it would not necessarily extend to the effect of gender 
quotas on policy outcomes through its influence on women’s participation in politics. 
Countries with gender quotas may be more liberal in general, and therefore would 
devote a higher share of government expenditures to social welfare. It may also be the 
case that male politicians in countries with gender quotas come under pressure to 
support policies related to women’s concerns in order to decrease the chance of 
electoral loss. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to investigate the question of 
whether the increase of women’s representation in politics, which results from adopting 
gender quotas, leads to more spending on policies related to women’s traditional role in 
the family. Under the assumption that gender quotas have neither direct impact on 
policy outcomes nor influence on policy outcomes through channels other than 
increasing the proportion of female legislators, gender quotas are a valid instrument for 
female legislators and can be used to study the effect of female legislators on policy 
outcomes. 
Table 5 provides the estimation of equation (3). Column (1) presents the results 
using gender quotas as an instrument for female legislators, while column (2) contains 
the results considering the types of quota systems and taking both as the instruments. I 
also report that the conditional p-value for the estimate, given by the STATA command 
condivreg, indicates robust results.
33 In the case with gender quotas as the instrument, 
there is an effect of female legislators on health and social welfare based on the 
conditional p-value. An increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage 
point increases the ratio of government expenditures on health and social welfare to 
GDP by 0.18 and 0.67 percentage points, respectively. Although women dislike 
expenditures on housing, it is not economically significant since the fraction of spending 
in housing on GDP is relatively small, compared with other expenditures. When taking 
both types of gender quota systems into account, female legislators are relevant to the 
expenditures on general public services and social welfare. It increases 0.53 and 0.39 
percentage points in government expenditures on general public services and social 
welfare relative to GDP, respectively, with an increase in the share of female legislators 
by one percentage point. On average, female legislators exert positive influences on 
health, education, and social welfare, and yield negative influences on defense, which is 
                                                 
32 Welfare State Expansion is one of the criteria to map the left positioning of a political party. For 
example, Budge, Ian, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, L. Bara, Judith and Eric Tanenbaum 
(2001), “Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998”, 
Oxford University Press. 
33 The p-value and confidence interval for the parameter on the endogenous regressor could be incorrect 
if the instruments are weak. Condivreg reports the conditional likelihood ratio confidence region and p-
value, both of which are robust to potentially weak instruments. The estimate by the limited information 
maximum likelihood (LIML) is exactly the same as the estimate by the two-stage least squares method 
in this case. Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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expected. In addition, female legislators do not play any role in total government 
spending. 
To further examine of the casual effect of the share of women in politics, rather 
than gender quotas, on policy outcomes, I first compare the ratio of estimate value of 
2 γ  to  1 γ  with r . In addition, the estimate of the reduced form, i.e., equation (2), would 
be as significant as the estimate by applying TSLS if gender quotas are a good 
instrument. Both of the conditions are satisfied with government expenditures on social 
welfare. In other words, gender quotas may influence government expenditures on 
social welfare through their effect on the proportion of female legislators. 
5. Robustness check 
In this section I exam the question about whether sample selection bias influences 
my results by 1) controlling for civil war, which is parallel to exclude African and Latin 
American countries, and 2) ruling out traditional OECD countries. In addition, I 
investigate whether the results are robust to the specification containing trend. 
5.1 Does civil war matter? 
Countries belonging to the fast track of gender equality in politics mostly came 
out of civil war or wars of liberation during the 1980s and early 1990s, which may result 
in enhanced eagerness for achieving political rights and guaranteeing constitutional civil 
rights. Additionally, the influence of civil conflict has perhaps served as an impetus to 
introduce legal quotas because it is easier to put questions of gender representation on 
the table. This raises a doubt about whether the presence of civil war is an omitted 
variable in this study. To simplify the analysis, I consider only “gender quotas” in this 
section and control for civil war. War refers to intra-state war with an ending year 
between 1970 and the year introducing a gender quota system, which is collected from 
the Correlates of War (COW) and is included as a binary indicator here. 
Estimation of equation (1) and (2) is given in Table 6 (The full results are reported 
in Appendix Table A1.). I control for War and present the results in column (1). The 
conclusions remain the same, i.e., gender quotas have an important impact on the 
increasing proportion of female legislators and there is a relevant reduced form effect of 
gender quotas on government expenditures on social welfare. Under the assumption 
that gender quotas influence policy choices only through higher levels of women in 
politics, I represent the proportion of female legislators with gender quotas and 
investigate the effect of female legislators on policy outcomes. The results are reported 
in column (1) of Table 7 (The full results are reported in Appendix Table A2.). There is 
an effect of female legislators on health and social welfare based on the conditional p-
value. An increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases 
the ratio of government expenditures on health and social welfare to GDP by 0.18 and 
0.70 percentage points, respectively. 
Similarly, socioeconomic background may influence a country’s choice of 
adopting gender quotas, which may bias the results. In most of the African countries, 
civil conflicts came to an end and women became active in politics in the early 1990s. In 
Latin American countries, women struggled for their rights as women and citizens in the 
political and social dimensions when economic reforms by the end of the 1980s and the  
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beginning of the 1990s aimed at reduced public spending had a significantly negative 
impact on women’s living conditions. Since a dramatic change of the rank order at the 
level of women’s representation in politics happened after countries in these two regions 
introduced gender quotas, it raises doubt about whether the results are driven by 
African countries and Latin American countries.
34 In column (2) of Table 6 I drop 
African countries and in column (3) of Table 6 I also drop Latin American countries. 
Excluding both African and Latin American countries, there is still a positive and 
significant effect of gender quotas on the share of female legislators, and a relevant 
reduced form effect of gender quotas on government expenditures on social welfare. 
Furthermore, the greater the share of female legislators, the higher the ratio of social 
welfare expenditures to GDP (This result is shown in column (3) of Table 7.). Overall, 
an omitted variable attributed to civil war does not drive the conclusions. 
5.2 Do OECD countries drive the results? 
There are 21 traditional OECD countries included in this study.
35 Most of them 
adopted party quotas, and only New Zealand and the United States are without any firm 
type of gender quotas.
36 These traditional OECD countries were, for long, at the top of 
the list of an established rank order of countries according to the level of women’s 
political representation, and their better economic development may reflect different 
preferences on policies relative to non-OECD countries. This raises doubt about 
whether OECD countries are driving the effect of gender quotas. I therefore re-examine 
the effect of gender quotas excluding these traditional OECD countries. 
An estimation of equation (1) excluding OECD countries is reported in Table 8 
(The full results are reported in Appendix Table A3.). Compared with the results in 
Table 4, the influence of gender quotas on the level of female legislators is smaller, but 
still significant.
37 With regard to the types of quotas, column (2) shows that legal quotas 
have a relatively higher and significant effect on the level of female legislators. This may 
capture the phenomenon that developing countries usually improve women’s 
representation in politics through the fast track. Most developing countries did not 
adopt gender quotas until the UN Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, and 
therefore experienced a significant jump in the share of female legislators after 
implementing legal gender quotas, such as in Latin American and African countries. 
                                                 
34 There are 6 African countries and 3 Latin American countries in the top 20 countries ranked by 
women in the parliament in 2008. Other countries on this list are traditional OECD countries. 
35 They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
36 Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires (2006) define the quota system in these two countries as “soft 
quotas”. The aim of soft quotas is to increase women’s representation more directly through informal 
targets and recommendations. It facilitates access, but does not necessarily mandate outcomes. For 
example, in the U.S., the presence of soft quotas has not translated into any great gains in legislative 
representation. 
37 The results of the other specification with quotas, OECD, and their interaction as independent 
variables show that gender quotas pass the joint F-test and have a strongly significant effect on the level 
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Estimation of equation (2), excluding OECD countries, is reported in Table 8. 
There is significant correlation between gender quotas and social welfare, but the scale is 
smaller than the case including all countries. Column (2) reports the results considering 
the types of gender quota systems. Voluntary party quotas are relevant to social welfare 
in that the share of government expenditures on social welfare is 2.32 percentage points 
higher in those countries adopting voluntary party quotas, as compared to those 
countries without party quotas. 
Table 9 reports the estimation of equation (3) (The full results are reported in 
Appendix Table A4.). Column (1) provides the results using gender quotas as an 
instrument for female legislators, while column (2) presents the results taking both types 
of quota systems as instruments. When OECD countries are excluded, there is only an 
effect of female legislators on social welfare expenditure based on the conditional p-
value. This implies that social welfare concerns women generally, even among non-
OECD countries. However, female legislators are irrelevant to any policy outcome in 
the case considering different types of gender quota systems. 
Overall, gender quotas have an important effect on the share of female legislators, 
and the result not driven by the OECD countries. Legal quotas, relative to voluntary 
party quotas, are more important when interpreting the representation of women in 
politics among developing countries. Moreover, the effect of quotas on female 
legislators is very likely to be translated into the influence of female policymakers on 
social welfare. 
5.3 A smaller panel dataset: do trends matter? 
To reduce the risk of biased estimates resulting from different time period 
backgrounds, in this section I consider a finer dataset containing only countries with a 
beginning sampling year before 1980 and an ending sampling year after 2000. Moreover, 
I collect two more observations around the year 1985 and the year 1995 for each 
country to capture the trend of policy outcomes and women’s representation in 
politics.
38 The panel dataset in this section therefore covers 49 countries between 1970 
and 2006, where there are 12 countries with legal gender quotas, 29 countries with 
voluntary party quotas, and 15 countries without any type of gender quotas.
39 Figure 1 
provides a simple graphic illustration of the relationship between gender quotas and the 
average proportion of female legislators. The line with points indicates the QG, and the 
line with triangles indicates the NQG. Most traditional OECD countries introduced 
gender quotas during mid-1980s, and most developing countries introduced gender 
quotas during 1990s. While some caution is needed in interpreting this graph since no 
other factors are being controlled, the figure shows that the average proportion of 
female legislators grows faster in the QG than in the NQG. The differences in the share 
                                                 
38 The mean value of the beginning year is 1973.4, and the mean value of the ending year is 2003.6. 
39 These countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Dominican Re, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea 
Republic of, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Panama, Philippines, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Bahamas, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, 
New Zealand, Oman, Singapore, Turkey, and the United States.  
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of female legislators between two groups are 3.6 percentage points in 1970s, 6.7 
percentage points in 1980s, 9.4 percentage points in 1990s, and 11.3 percentage points 
in 2000s. Gender quotas seem to be the factor resulting in this growing difference. 
The following empirical specifications provide a more systematic investigation of 
the effect of gender quotas, which are similar to equation (1), (2) and (3), but including 
this trend. 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i GDP Duration trend Quotas FEM , , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ε θ δ γ β α + + + + + + =  (4) 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i GDP Duration trend Quotas EXP , , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , ε θ δ γ β α + + + + + + =  (5) 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i cGDP dDuration trend rFEM b a EXP , , , , , ς + + + + + + + =    (6) 
 
where Duration denotes the duration between each two adjacent observations for 
an individual country. 
Estimation of equation (4) is reported in Table 10 (The full results are reported in 
Appendix Table A5.). Gender quotas are relevant to the level of female legislators 
(including the OECD countries) in that the proportion of female legislators in the QG 
after the introduction of gender quotas is 4.46 percentage points higher than that in 
NQG. Column (2) is the results considering different types of gender quota systems. 
Voluntary party quotas are more relevant to female legislators in the sample that 
includes OECD countries. The proportion of female legislators in the QG after 
adopting voluntary party quotas is 5.59 percentage points higher than that in the 
NQG.
40 
An estimation of equation (5) is also reported in Table 10. There is a positive and 
significant reduced form effect of gender quotas on social service and welfare. 
Government expenditures on social welfare in the QG after the introduction of gender 
quotas is 1.25 percentage points higher than that in the NQG. Gender quotas also yield 
influence on general public services, which include public debt transactions and 
transfers between different levels of government. This might be the case since it has 
been suggested that women are more liberal on average.
41 Therefore, female legislators 
may tend to raise the public debt and transfer money to local governments in order to 
                                                 
40 On the other hand, legal quotas are more relevant in the sample excluding OECD countries. The level 
of female legislators in countries after adopting legal quotas is 6.20 percentage points higher than that in 
countries without quotas. These results are not reported in the table. 
41 Lott and Kenny (1999) suggest that the influence of female voters may have been reflected in the large 
increase in state transfers to local governments. They also suggest that after the 1970s, women prefer 
big governments. Edlund and Pande (2002) claim that women are more likely to support the 
Democratic Party as the divorce rate increases. Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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provide better policies for children, the family, and women. The effect is also significant 
with the controls for different types of gender quotas. 
Estimation of equation (6) is reported in Table 11 (The full results are reported in 
Appendix Table A6.). In the cases with gender quotas as the instrument, there is an 
effect of female legislators on general public services, economic affairs, and social 
welfare. Nevertheless, there are only reduced form effects of gender quotas on 
government expenditures on general public services and social welfare. An increase in 
the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of 
government expenditures on general public services and social welfare to GDP by 0.53 
and 0.28 percentage points, respectively. In cases considering different types of gender 
quota systems, female legislators are relevant to both the expenditures on general public 
services and social welfare. 
Generally, gender quotas have an important effect on the representation of 
women in politics, and consequently yield a significant influence of female legislators on 
government expenditures on social welfare. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether political reservations have 
increased expenditures on groups that benefit from the mandate. While most economic 
research studying the effect of political reservation for women on policy outcomes uses 
within-country data, the contribution of this study is to investigate the reservation effect 
of women on a cross-country basis. 
The results using two observations for each country suggest that there is an effect 
of female legislators on government expenditures of social welfare, where the increasing 
representation of female legislators resulted from a gender equality policy. In other 
words, gender quotas are very likely to influence policy outcomes through its effect on 
the proportion of female legislators. This conclusion is made under the assumption that 
gender quotas have neither a direct impact on policy outcomes nor do they influence 
policy outcomes through channels other than increasing the proportion of female 
legislators. The results are robust to civil war and stage of development. 
The second part of the analysis covers countries with a beginning sampling year 
before 1980 and an ending sampling year after 2000, and collects two more observations 
per country to capture the trend of policy outcomes and the level of female legislators. 
The increasing representation of women in politics affects government spending 
decisions, especially for those issues related to women’s traditional role in the family. 
Social welfare is again confirmed as the issue that is most concerning for women. An 
increase in the share of female legislators by one percentage point increases the ratio of 
expenditure on social welfare to GDP by 0.28 percentage points. This conclusion is not 
driven by a time trend. 
The results also suggest that the fast track to gender equality by mandated legal 
gender quotas among developing countries has a sound effect on the representation of 
women in politics, but the increasing level of female legislators in developing countries 
may not yet yield an impact on policy outcomes. Therefore, continuous tracking of the 
data would facilitate investigation of the effect of women in politics on policy outcomes.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Effect of gender quotas on average proportion of female legislators 
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Table 1: Gender quotas policies by country, quota type and year of adoption  
   Party Quotas   Legal Quotas     Party Quotas   Legal Quotas 
Albania   -      N      Jordan   N      Y   2003  
Argentina   Y   2000   Y   1991   Kenya   Y   1990s   Y   1997  
Australia   Y   1994   N      Korea , Republic of   N      Y   2004  
Austria   Y   1985   N      Lithuania   Y   1995   N     
Bangladesh   N      Y   1972   Luxembourg   Y   1990s   N     
Belgium   Y   1985   Y   1994   Malta   Y   2000s   N     
Bolivia   N      Y   1997   Mexico   Y   2002   Y   1996  
Botswana   Y   1999   N      Moldova , Republic of   Y   2004   N     
Brazil   Y   1986   Y   1997   Morocco   Y   1989   N     
Burkina Faso   Y   2002   N      Nepal   -      Y   1990  
Burundi   -      Y   2004   The Netherlands   Y   1987   N     
Cameroon   Y   1996   N      Norway   Y   1975   N     
Canada   Y   1985   N      Pakistan   -      Y   2000  
Chile   Y   1988   N      Panama   N      Y   1997  
Costa Rica   Y   1995   Y   1997   Peru   N      Y   1997  
Croatia   Y   1996   N      Philippines   Y   1984   Y   1995  
Cyprus   Y   1990s   N      Poland   Y   2001   N     
Czech Republic   Y   1990s   N      Portugal   Y   2004   N     
Denmark   Y   1977   Y   1988   Romania   Y   2001   N     
Dominican Re   Y   1994   Y   1997   Slovakia   Y   1990s   N     
Egypt   N      Y   1979   Slovenia   Y   1992   N     
El Salvador   Y   1992   N      Spain   Y   1988   N     
Ethiopia   Y   2004   N      Sudan   N      Y   2000  
Germany   Y   1986   N      Sweden   Y   1987   N     
Greece   Y   1994   N      Switzerland   Y   1986   N     
Hungary   Y   1993   N      Thailand   Y   2000s   N     
Iceland   Y   1999   N      Tunisia   Y   2004   N     
India   Y   1990s   N      Uganda   N      Y   1995  
Indonesia   N      Y   2003   The United Kingdom   Y   1981   N     
Ireland   Y   1991   N      Uruguay   Y   1980   N     
Israel   Y   1997   N      Venezuela   N      Y   1997  
Italy   Y   1987   Y   1993                 
Source: International IDEA and Krook (2006). 
Note: 1. ‘-’ means data not available. 2. Year with ‘s’ in the end refers to the decade of adoption provided in Krook (2006) 
since no further information could be obtained. 3. Countries without any type of gender quotas between 1970 and 2005 are 
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, Georgia, Grenada, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, New Zealand, Oman, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, 
Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Viet Nam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
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Table 2: Classification of Expense by Function of Government 
7   Total outlays  
701   General public services  
7011        Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, 
external affairs  
7012   Foreign economic aid  
7013   General services  
7014   Basic research  
7015   R&D Gerneral public services  
7016   General public services n.e.c.  
7017   Public debt transactions  
7018     Transfers of a general character between different levels of 
government  
702   Defense  
7021   Military defense  
7022   Civil defense  
7023   Foreign military aid  
7024   R&D Defense  
7025   Defense n.e.c  
703   Public order and safety  
7031   Police services  
7032   Fire protection services  
7033   Law courts  
7034   Prisons  
7035   R&D Public order and safety  
7036   Public order and safety n.e.c  
(continued) Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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(continued) 
704   Economic affairs  
7041   General economic, commercial, and labor affairs  
7042   Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting  
7043   Fuel and energy  
7044   Mining manufacturing, and construction  
7045   Transport  
7046   Communication  
7047   Other industries  
7048   R&D Economic affairs  
7049   Economic affairs n.e.c.  
705   Environmental protection  
7051   Waste management  
7052   Waste water management  
7053   Pollution abatement  
7054   Protection of biodiversity and landscape  
7055   R&D Environmental protection  
7056   Environmental protection n.e.c.  
706    Housing and community amenities  
7061   Housing development  
7062   Community development  
7063   Water supply  
7064   Street lighting  
7065   R&D Housing and community amenities  
7066   Housing and community amenities n.e.c.  
707   Health  
7071    Medical products, appliances, and equipment  
7072   Outpatient services  
7073   Hospital services  
7074   Public health services  
7075   R&D Health  
7076   Health n.e.c  
(continued)  
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(continued) 
708   Recreation, culture, and religion  
7081   Recreational and sporting services  
7082   Cultural services  
7083   Broadcasting and publishing services  
7084   Religious and other community services  
7085   R&D Recreation, culture, and religion  
7086   Recreation, culture, and religion n.e.c.  
709   Education  
7091   Pre-primary and primary education  
7092   Secondary education  
7093   Postsecondary nontertiary education  
7094   Tertiary education  
7095   Education not definable by level  
7096   Subsidiary services to education  
7097   R&D Education  
7098   Education n.e.c.  
710   Social protection  
7101   Sickness and disability  
7102   Old age  
7103   Survivors  
7104   Family and children  
7105   Unemployment  
7106   Housing  
7107   Social exclusion n.e.c.  
7108   R&D Social protection  
7109   Social protection n.e.c.  
R&D = Research and development. 
n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified. 
Source: Table 6.2 in Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 (GFSM 2001), issued by IMF.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table 3: Mean percentage points of the level of female legislators and expenditures on policy outcomes 
to GDP 
with OECD countries   without OECD countries  
  
Before   After  Obs.  Before  After   Obs. 
Female Legislators  
Quotas   6.24   18.41  56   5.82   14.45   38  
   (0.76)   (1.36)     (0.94)   (1.15)     
 Party quotas   6.86   19.46  47   6.71   14.93   29  
   (0.87)   (1.52)     (1.16)   (1.34)     
 Legal quotas   4.21   16.45  22   3.62   14.67   19  
   (0.79)   (2.19)     (0.56)   (1.94)     
No quotas   6.23   12.12  43   5.98   11.01   40  
   (1.06)   (1.37)     (1.07)   (1.26)     
Total Government Spending 
Quotas   27.38   29.59  56   29.44   29.19   38  
   (2.00)   (1.43)     (2.54)   (1.68)     
 Party quotas   26.14   29.69  47   27.63   29.22   29  
   (1.87)   (1.46)     (1.83)   (1.69)     
 Legal quotas   27.90   26.63  22   30.84   26.80   19  
   (5.16)   (2.51)     (6.41)   (2.59)     
No quotas   24.04   27.19  43   23.75   26.52   40  
   (2.05)   (1.39)     (2.11)   (1.38)     
General Public Services 
Quotas    2.72   6.47   56   2.76   6.10   38  
  (0.25)   (0.41)     (0.32)   (0.49)     
 Party quotas   2.53   6.52   47   2.46   6.06   29  
   (0.23)   (0.41)     (0.31)   (0.47)     
 Legal quotas   2.68   6.71   22   2.62   5.81   19  
   (0.42)   (0.86)     (0.49)   (0.78)     
No quotas   4.20   7.00   43   4.16   7.36   40  
   (0.78)   (0.77)     (0.81)   (0.80)     
 (continued) 
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(continued)  
with OECD countries 
countries  
without OECD countries  
  
Before   After   Obs.   Before   After   Obs.  
Defense  
Quotas   2.70   1.61   56   2.90   1.59   38  
   (0.56)   (0.20)      (0.81)   (0.23)     
 Party quotas   2.59   1.63   47   2.77   1.61   29  
   (0.64)   (0.24)      (1.02)   (0.29)     
 Legal quotas   2.45   1.35   22   2.51   1.35   19  
   (0.48)   (0.18)      (0.55)   (0.20)     
No quotas   2.87   2.22   43   2.71   2.24   40  
   (0.55)   (0.25)      (0.57)   (0.25)     
Health 
Quotas  1.86   3.15   56   1.61   2.53   38  
  (0.24)   (0.32)      (0.27)   (0.33)    
Party quotas  1.97   3.44   47   1.72   2.81   29  
  (0.27)   (0.35)      (0.34)   (0.40)    
 Legal quotas   1.20   1.63   22   1.00   1.45   19  
   (0.24)   (0.38)      (0.20)   (0.32)     
No quotas   2.00   2.33   43   1.64   2.22   40  
   (0.35)   (0.22)      (0.18)   (0.20)     
Education  
Quotas   2.86   3.23   56   2.83   3.25   38  
   (0.22)   (0.27)      (0.24)   (0.28)     
 Party quotas   2.78   3.25   47   2.69   3.28   29  
    (0.23)   (0.30)      (0.25)   (0.31)     
 Legal quotas   2.92   3.02   22   2.61   3.00   19  
    (0.36)   (0.38)      (0.37)   (0.42)     
No quotas   4.00   3.77   43   3.64   3.82   40  
    (0.52)   (0.39)      (0.34)   (0.40)     
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(continued)  
with OECD countries 
countries  
without OECD countries  
  
Before   After   Obs.   Before   After   Obs.  
Housing   
Quotas    0.56   0.52   56   0.5   0.57   38  
    (0.08)   (0.07)      (0.10)   (0.08)     
 Party quotas   0.57   0.48   47   0.51   0.53   29  
    (0.09)   (0.07)      (0.12)   (0.09)     
 Legal quotas   0.43   0.57   22   0.41   0.64   19  
    (0.09)   (0.12)      (0.10)   (0.13)     
No quotas    0.92   1.02   43   0.92   1.06   40  
    (0.22)   (0.29)      (0.24)   (0.31)     
Economic Affairs  
Quotas    5.29   3.25   56   5.67   3.22   38  
   (0.65)   (0.30)      (0.93)   (0.33)     
 Party quotas   5.22   3.43   47   5.69   3.50   29  
    (0.72)   (0.32)      (1.12)   (0.36)     
 Legal quotas   5.08   2.34   22   5.03   2.39   19  
    (0.70)   (0.35)      (0.81)   (0.40)     
No quotas    8.20   4.16   43   7.70   4.29   40  
    (1.40)   (0.47)      (1.31)   (0.50)     
Social Welfare  
Quotas    5.76   9.32   56   3.73   6.62   38  
    (0.71)   (0.90)      (0.72)   (0.93)     
 Party quotas   6.62   10.69   47   4.49   8.01   29  
    (0.78)   (0.94)      (0.88)   (1.06)     
 Legal quotas   3.31   4.81   22   1.65   2.87   19  
    (1.00)   (1.26)      (0.44)   (0.76)     
No quotas    4.42   4.42   43   3.44   4.13   40  
    (1.03)   (0.64)      (0.65)   (0.65)     
Note: standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4: The effect of gender quotas on the representation of female legislators and policy outcomes  
Female Legislators   Total Gov 
Spending   General Public Services  Defense   Health  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   5.034   -   -0.718   -   1.684   -   -0.567   -   0.881   -  
   (1.710)***     (3.278)      (1.092)      (.728)      (.559)     
Party Quotas   -   4.184   -   2.216   -   1.828   -   -0.105   -   1.018  
      (1.828)**     (3.045)      (.939)*      (.701)      (.499)**  
Legal Quotas   -   2.325   -   -4.953   -   0.948   -   -0.413   -   -0.561  
      (2.369)      (4.038)      (1.314)      (.730)      (.604)  
Duration   -1.376   -1.359   -0.759   -0.517   -0.870   -0.066   0.105   0.116   -0.128   -0.065  
   (.616)**   (2.369)**  (1.032)   (.962)   (.332)   (.327)   (.269)   (.250)   (.163)   (.168)  
Duration²   0.041   0.041   0.021   0.016   0.000   -0.000   -0.003   -0.004   0.003   0.002  
   (.016)**   (.017)**   (.026)   (.025)   (.009)   (.009)   (.007)   (.006)   (.004)   (.004)  
DRGDP   1.713   1.713   5.423   4.569   0.351   0.244   0.728   0.641   0.414   0.294  
   (1.619)   (1.694)   (3.679)   (3.334)   (1.637)   (1.684)   (.605)   (.654)   (.351)   (.354)  
R²   0.24   0.24   0.04   0.07   0.04   0.05   0.02   0.02   0.05   0.07  
Observations   188   188   188   188   188   188   188   188   188   188  
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(continued)  
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   0.156   -   -0.458   -   1.508   -   3.383   -  
   (.793)      (.383)      (1.406)      (1.189)***     
Party Quotas   -   0.242   -   -0.476   -   1.465   -   3.545  
      (.699)      (.343)      (1.275)      (1.033)***  
Legal Quotas   -   -0.228   -   0.015   -   0.216   -   -0.548  
      (.646)      (.212)      (1.413)      (.999)  
Duration   -0.015   0.003   0.094   0.075   -0.504   -0.457   -0.514   -0.354  
   (.236)   (.243)   (.089)   (.085)   (.419)   (.425)   (.377)   (.367)  
Duration²   -0.000   -0.001   -0.002   -0.002   0.009   0.008   0.013   0.009  
   (.006)   (.006)   (.002)   (.002)   (.011)   (.011)   (.009)   (.009)  
DRGDP   1.466   1.424   0.378   0.415   2.241   2.154   0.270   -0.033  
   (.626)**   (.648)**   (.517)   (.529)   (1.556)   (1.613)   (.780)   (.790)  
R²   0.06   0.06   0.05   0.06   0.08   0.08   0.13   0.14  
Observations   188   188   188   188   188   188   188   188  
(continued)  
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(continued) 
Total Gov Spending   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   -0.137   -0.027   0.334   0.390   -0.113   -0.056   0.175   0.115  
   (.572)   (.462)   (.233)   (.236)   (.154)   (.145)   (.113)   (.109)  
Duration   -0.945   -0.807   0.373   0.443   -0.050   0.022   0.113   0.037  
   (1.281)   (1.330)   (.509)   (.526)   (.335)   (.322)   (.246)   (.228)  
Duration²   0.027   0.023   -0.014   -0.016   0.001   -0.001   -0.004   -0.002  
   (.035)   (.037)   (.014)   (.014)   (.009)   (.009)   (.007)   (.006)  
DRGDP   5.650   5.373   -0.222   -0.362   0.921   0.777   0.114   0.265  
   (3.371)*   (3.700)   (1.324)   (1.374)   (.871)   (.841)   (.640)   (.595)  
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
p-value   0.810   0.940   0.108   0.069   0.447   0.719   0.091   0.254  
Observations   188   188   188   188   188   188   188   188  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. Duration² denotes the square of Duration.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table 5: The effect of female legislators on policy outcomes  
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   0.031   0.019   -0.091   -0.077   0.299   0.262   0.672   0.533  
   (.133)   (.139)   (.060)   (.068)   (.259)   (.241)   (.322)**   (.277)*  
Duration   0.027   0.011   -0.031   -0.013   -0.092   -0.140   0.411   0.234  
   (.289)   (.284)   (.131)   (.125)   (.566)   (.555)   (.702)   (.617)  
Duration²   -0.001   -0.001   0.002   0.001   -0.004   -0.002   -0.015   -0.009  
   (.008)   (.008)   (.004)   (0.003)   (.016)   (.015)   (.019)   (.017)  
DRGDP   1.413   1.444   0.534   0.499   1.728   1.824   -0.881   -0.530  
   (.752)*   (.741)*   (.340)   (.326)   (1.472)   (1.449)   (1.826)   (1.611)  
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
p-value   0.813   0.882   0.093   0.163   0.253   0.348   0.002   0.004  
Observations   188   188   188   188   188   188   188   188  
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(continued) 
Education  Housing  Economic Affairs  Social Welfare 
 
(1) (2) (1)  (2) (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Fem  0.031 0.019 -0.091  -0.077  0.299  0.262  0.672  0.533 
   (.133)  (.139)  (.060)  (.068)  (.259)  (.241)  (.322)**  (.277)* 
Duration  0.027 0.011 -0.031  -0.013 -0.092  -0.140  0.411  0.234 
   (.289)  (.284)  (.131)  (.125)  (.566)  (.555)  (.702)  (.617) 
Duration²  -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.004  -0.002  -0.015  -0.009 
   (.008)  (.008)  (.004)  (0.003)  (.016)  (.015)  (.019)  (.017) 
DRGDP  1.413 1.444 0.534  0.499 1.728  1.824  -0.881  -0.530 
   (.752)*  (.741)*  (.340)  (.326)  (1.472)  (1.449)  (1.826)  (1.611) 
IV                         
 Gender quotas  Y  -  Y  -  Y  -  Y  - 
 Party & Legal quotas  -  Y  -  Y  -  Y  -  Y 
p-value  0.813  0.882  0.093  0.163  0.253  0.348  0.002  0.004 
Observations  188 188 188  188 188  188  188  188 
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. Duration² denotes the square of Duration. 4. P-value refers to conditional p-value of Fem estimated 
by LIML. 
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Table 6: Robustness check: does civil war matter? (I)  
Female Legislators   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
Dep. Var.   
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Quotas   4.801   5.136   6.116   1.654   1.646   2.499   -0.600  -0.069  -0.295  0.875   1.062   1.176  
   (1.691)***   (2.009)**  (2.211)***  (1.119)  (1.025)  (1.030)**   (.720)  (.835)  (1.050)  (.569)   (.687)   (.873)  
War   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -  
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America  Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
R²   0.3   0.24   0.29   0.04   0.05   0.13   0.03   0.03   0.05   0.05   0.06   0.05  
Observations  188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dep. Var.   
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Quotas   0.158   0.675   0.691   -0.45   -0.716  -0.936   1.527   0.865   1.171   3.378   3.924   4.533  
   (.807)   (.912)   (1.142)   (.389)  (.436)  (.562)   (1.453) (1.514) (1.852) (1.213)*** (1.427)*** (1.758)**   
War   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -  
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America  Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
R²   0.06   0.02   0.02   0.06   0.06   0.19   0.08   0.06   0.07   0.13   0.15   0.18  
Observations  188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Real 
GDP per capita and year are control variables in each regression.  
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Table 7: Robustness check: does civil war matter? (II)  
General Public Services   Defense   Health   Education   IV: gender  
quotas   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Fem   0.345   0.32   0.409   -0.125   -0.013   -0.048   0.182   0.207   0.192   0.033   0.131   0.113  
   -0.247   -0.224   (.235)*   -0.161   -0.168   -0.176   -0.119   -0.139   -0.14   -0.14   -0.164   -0.164  
War   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -  
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
p-value   0.116   0.084   0.011   0.422   0.937   0.782   0.095   0.092   0.131   0.811   0.362   0.448  
Observations   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
  
Fem   -0.094   -0.139   -0.153   0.318   0.168   0.191   0.704   0.764   0.741           
   -0.063   -0.079   (.083)*   -0.272   -0.262   -0.269   (.341)**   (.401)*   (.397)*           
War   Y   -   -   Y   -   -   Y   -   -           
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N           
Latin America   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N           
p-value   0.1   0.023   0.011   0.25   0.528   0.484   0.002   0.002   0.002           
Observations   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124           
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Real 
GDP per capita and year are control variables in each regression. 4. P-value refers to conditional p-value estimated by LIML.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table 8: Robustness check: do OECD countries drive the results? (I) 
Female Legislators   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   3.113   -   .846   -   -1.057   -   .236   -  
   (1.813)*      -1.16      (.851)      (.321)     
Party Quotas   -   .718   -   1.161   -   -.496   -   .397  
      (1.937)      (.994)      (.935)      (.345)  
Legal Quotas   -   6.561   -   -.219   -   -.562   -   -.283  
      (2.370)***      (1.498)      (.967)      (.390)  
R²   0.1   0.19   0.03   0.03   0.04   0.03   0.03   0.05  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146   146   146  
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   -.398   -   -.424   -   .194   -   1.924   -  
   (.524)      (.411)      (1.232)      (.714)***     
Party Quotas   -   -.172   -   -.428   -   .165   -   2.316  
      (.482)      (.359)      (1.356)      (.761)***  
Legal Quotas   -   -.141   -   .022   -   .554   -   -.549  
      (.575)      (.263)      (1.706)      (.867)  
R²   0.19   0.19   0.06   0.06   0.11   0.11   0.11   0.14  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146   146   146  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Real 
GDP per capita and year are control variables in each regression.   
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Table 9: Robustness check: do OECD countries drive the results? (II) 
General Public Services  Defense   Health   Education  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   .272   .028   -.340   -.105   .076   -.024   -.128   -.028  
   (.408)   (.246)   (.346)   (.122)   (.109)   (.061)   (.165)   (.084)  
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
p-value   0.483   0.953   0.233   0.451   0.468   0.630   0.407   0.763  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146   146   146  
Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare        
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)        
Fem   -.136   -.022   .062   .089   .618   .021        
   (.128)   (.047)   (.411)   (.210)   (.406)   (.116)        
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -        
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y        
p-value   0.195   0.732   0.884   0.729   0.007   0.339        
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146        
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Real 
GDP per capita and year are control variables in each regression. 4. P-value refers to conditional p-value estimated by LIML.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table 10: Robustness check: do trends matter? (I) 
Female Legislators   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   4.459   -   2.38   -   -.218   -   .274   -  
   (1.780)**      (.922)**      (.601)      (.446)     
Party Quotas   -   5.593   -   1.506   -   -.406   -   .247  
      (1.707)***      (.791)*      (.576)      (.447)  
Legal Quotas   -   3.018   -   2.232   -   .536   -   -.463  
      (2.463)      (1.251)*      (.498)      (.510)  
R²   0.82   0.83   0.65   0.64   0.66   0.66   0.66   0.66  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184   189   184  
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   -.030   -   -.441   -   1.832   -   1.246   -  
   (.570)      (.350)      (1.158)      (.558)**     
Party Quotas   -   -.281   -   -.511   -   1.210   -   1.325  
      (.558)      (.331)      (1.075)      (.583)**  
Legal Quotas   -   .546   -   .143   -   1.978   -   .131  
      (.565)      (.285)      (1.512)      (.704)  
R²   0.7   0.7   0.55   0.55   0.71   0.71   0.86   0.86  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184   189   184  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Real 
GDP per capita and year are control variables in each regression. 4. Trend, country and time dummies are included.   
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Table 11: Robustness check: do trends matter? (II) 
General Public Services   Defense   Health   Education  
  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   .534   .334   -.049   -.038   .062   .017   -.007   -.018  
   (.256)**   (.142)**   (.113)   (.087)   (.086)   (.068)   (.107)   (.079)  
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184   189   184  
Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
 
Fem   -.099   -.072   .411   .277   .279   .210        
   (.070)   (.050)   (.245)*   (.167)   (.122)**   (.081)***        
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -        
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y        
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184        
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Real 
GDP per capita and year are control variables in each regression. 4. Country and time dummies are included.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Robustness check: does civil war matter? (I)  
Female Legislators   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
Dep. Var.  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Quotas   4.80   5.14   6.12   1.65   1.65   2.50   -0.60   -0.07   -0.30   0.88   1.06   1.18  
   (1.69)***   (2.01)**   (2.21)***   (1.12)   (1.03)   (1.03)**   (.72)   (.84)   (1.05)   (.57)   (.69)   (.87)  
Duration   -1.21   -1.28   -1.87   -0.07   0.12   -0.11   0.13   0.23   0.29   -0.12   -0.16   -0.10  
   (.62)*   (.74)*   (.84)**   (.33)   (.32)   (.34)   (.26)   (.32)   (1.05)   (.17)   (.21)   (.29)  
Duration²   0.04   0.04   0.06   -0.00   -0.00   0.00   -0.00   -0.01   -0.01   0.00   0.00   0.00  
   (.02)**   (.02)**   (.02)**   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.00)   (.01)   (.01)  
DRGDP   0.98   -0.53   -0.18   0.26   0.07   0.67   0.62   0.58   1.12   0.40   0.18   0.05  
   (1.68)   (2.35)   (2.89)   (1.71)   (.97)   (.91)   (.59)   (.98)   (1.41)   (.35)   (.48)   (.57)  
War   -5.76   -   -   -0.73   -   -   -0.82   -   -   -0.14   -   -  
   (2.03)***         (1.20)         (.88)         (.44)        
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
R²   0.3   0.24   0.29   0.04   0.05   0.13   0.03   0.03   0.05   0.05   0.06   0.05  
Observations   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
(continued)  
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(continued) 
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dep. Var.   
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Quotas   0.16   0.68   0.69   -0.45   -0.72   -0.94   1.53   0.87   1.17   3.38   3.92   4.53  
   (.81)   (.91)   (1.14)   (.39)   (.44)   (.56)   (1.45)   (1.51)   (1.85)   (1.21)***   (1.43)***   (1.76)**  
Duration   -0.02   -0.12   -0.06   0.09   0.12   0.15   -0.52   -0.69   -0.82   -0.51   -0.53   -0.87  
   (.24)   (.27)   (.38)   (.09)   (.10)   (.14)   (.43)   (.48)   (.67)   (.39)   (.45)   (.61)  
Duration²   -0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.00   -0.00   -0.00   0.01   0.01   0.02   0.01   0.01   0.02  
   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.00)   (.00)   (.00)   (.01)   (.01)   (.02)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)  
DRGDP   1.47   0.37   0.41   0.40   0.87   1.14   2.30   1.57   2.03   0.25   -0.72   -1.04  
   (.62)**   (.72)   (.88)   (.51)   (.69)   (.80)   (1.64)   (1.05)   (1.45)   (.79)   (.84)   (1.01)  
War   0.06   -   -   0.18   -   -   0.48   -   -   -0.12   -   -  
   (.60)         (.20)         (1.76)         (.96)        
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America  Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
R²   0.06   0.02   0.02   0.06   0.06   0.19   0.08   0.06   0.07   0.13   0.15   0.18  
Observations   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. Duration² denotes the square of Duration. Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
51 
Table A2: Robustness check: does civil war matter? (II)  
General Public Services   Defense   Health   Education  
IV: gender quotas   
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Fem   0.34   0.32   0.41   -0.12   -0.01   -0.05   0.18   0.21   0.19   0.03   0.13   0.11  
   (.25)   (.22)   (.24)*   (.16)   (.17)   (.18)   (.12)   (.14)   (.14)   (.14)   (.16)   (.16)  
Duration   0.35   0.53   0.65   -0.02   0.22   0.20   0.10   0.11   0.26   0.02   0.05   0.15  
   (.50)   (.50)   (.66)   (.33)   (.38)   (.49)   (.24)   (.31)   (.39)   (.28)   (.36)   (.46)  
Duration²   -0.01   -0.02   -0.22   0.00   -0.01   -0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.01   -0.00   -0.00   -0.01  
   (.01)   (.01)   (.02)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)   (.01)  
DRGDP   -0.08   0.24   0.74   0.75   0.58   1.11   0.22   0.29   0.08   1.44   0.44   0.43  
   (1.28)   (1.30)   (1.64)   (.84)   (.98)   (1.23)   (.62)   (.81)   (.98)   (.73)*   (.95)   (1.14)  
War   1.26   -   -   -1.54   -   -   0.91   -   -   0.25   -   -  
   (2.06)         (1.34)         (.99)         (1.17)        
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
p-value   0.12   0.08   0.01   0.42   0.94   0.78   0.10   0.09   0.13   0.81   0.36   0.45  
Observations   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
(continued)  
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(continued) 
Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (1)   (2)   (3)  
Fem   -0.09   -0.14   -0.15   0.32   0.17   0.19   0.70   0.76   0.74  
   (.06)   (.08)*   (.08)*   (.27)   (.26)   (.27)   (.34)**   (.40)*   (.40)*  
Duration   -0.02   -0.06   -0.14   -0.13   -0.48   -0.47   0.34   0.45   0.52  
   (.13)   (.18)   (0.23)   (.55)   (.58)   (.75)   (.69)   (.89)   (1.11)  
Duration²   0.00   0.00   0.00   -0.00   0.01   0.01   -0.01   -0.02   -0.02  
   (.00)   (.00)   (.01)   (.02)   (.02)   (.02)   (.02)   (.03)   (.03)  
DRGDP   0.49   0.79   1.11   1.99   1.66   2.07   -0.44   -0.32   -0.90  
   (.33)   (.46)   (.58)*   (1.41)   (1.52)   (1.88)   (1.77)   (2.33)   (2.77)  
War   -0.36   -   -   2.31   -   -   3.93   -   -  
   (.53)         (2.26)         (2.84)        
Africa   Y   N   N   Y   N   N   Y   N   N  
Latin America   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N   Y   Y   N  
p-value   0.10   0.02   0.01   0.25   0.53   0.48   0.00   0.00   0.00  
Observations   188   156   124   188   156   124   188   156   124  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. Duration² denotes the square of Duration. 4. P-value refers to conditional p-value of Fem estimated 
by LIML.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table A3: Robustness check: do OECD countries drive the results? (I)  
Female Legislators   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   3.113   -   0.846   -   -1.057   -   0.236   -  
   (1.813)*      -1.16      (.851)      (.321)     
Party Quotas   -   0.718   -   1.161   -   -0.496   -   0.397  
      (1.937)      (.994)      (.935)      (.345)  
Legal Quotas   -   6.561   -   -0.219   -   -0.562   -   -0.283  
      (2.370)***      (1.498)      (.967)      (.390)  
Duration   -0.840   -1.141   0.089   0.141   0.171   0.173   -0.013   0.015  
   (.657)   (.675)*   (.375)   (.366)   (.320)   (.280)   (.097)   (.096)  
Duration²   0.024   0.030   -0.004   -0.006   -0.005   -0.005   0.000   -0.001  
   (.017)   (.017)*   (.011)   (.010)   (.009)   (.008)   (.002)   (.002)  
DRGDP   1.129   1.675   0.342   0.217   0.871   0.804   0.342   0.284  
   (1.287)   (1.366)   (1.650)   (1.716)   (.594)   (.647)   (.310)   (.314)  
R²   0.10   0.19   0.03   0.03   0.04   0.03   0.03   0.05  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146   146   146  
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(continued) 
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   -0.398   -   -0.424   -   0.194   -   1.924   -  
   (.524)      (.411)      (1.232)      (.714)***     
Party Quotas   -   -0.172   -   -0.428   -   0.165   -   2.316  
      (.482)      (.359)      (1.356)      (.761)***  
Legal Quotas   -   -0.141   -   -0.022   -   0.554   -   -0.549  
      (.575)      (.263)      (1.706)      (.867)  
Duration   0.035   0.032   0.083   0.067   -0.208   -0.232   -0.131   -0.016  
   (.169)   (.175)   (.093)   (.091)   (.385)   (.391)   (.245)   (.235)  
Duration²   -0.001   -0.001   -0.002   -0.001   0.001   0.002   0.003   0.000  
   (.004)   (.005)   (.002)   (.002)   (.011)   (.011)   (.006)   (.006)  
DRGDP   1.774   1.749   0.479   0.506   2.606   2.622   0.305   0.082  
   (.592)***   (.608)***   (.537)   (.546)   (1.541)*   (1.626)   (.647)   (.678)  
R²   0.19   0.19   0.06   0.06   0.11   0.11   0.11   0.14  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146   146   146  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. Duration² denotes the square of Duration.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table A4: Robustness check: do OECD countries drive the results? (II)  
General Public Services   Defense   Health   Education  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   0.272   0.019   -0.340   -0.105   0.076   -0.024   -0.128   -0.028  
   (.408)   (.219)   (.346)   (.122)   (.109)   (.061)   (.165)   (.084)  
Duration   0.318   0.120   -0.115   0.069   0.050   -0.028   -0.072   0.005  
   (.539)   (.446)   (.458)   (.337)   (.144)   (.123)   (.218)   (.177)  
Duration²   -0.011   -0.005   0.003   -0.002   -0.002   0.001   0.002   -0.000  
   (.015)   (.012)   (.012)   (.009)   (.004)   (.003)   (.006)   (.005)  
DRGDP   0.035   0.426   1.254   0.892   0.257   0.412   1.918   1.764  
   (1.339)   (1.168)   (1.137)   (.882)   (.359)   (.323)   (.542)***   (.463)***  
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
p-value   0.483   0.953   0.233   0.541   0.468   0.630   0.407   0.763  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146   146   146  
(continued)  
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(continued) 
Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   -0.136   -0.022   0.062   0.089   0.618   0.021  
   (.128)   (.047)   (.411)   (.210)   (.406)   (.116)  
Duration   -0.031   0.058   -0.155   -0.134   0.388   -0.078  
   (.169)   (.122)   (.543)   (.469)   (.537)   (.256)  
Duration²   0.002   -0.001   -0.000   -0.001   -0.012   0.002  
   (.005)   (.003)   (.015)   (.012)   (.014)   (.007)  
DRGDP   0.633   0.457   2.535   2.494   -0.392   0.529  
   (.419)   (.319)   (1.348)*   (1.230)   (1.335)   (.723)  
IV                    
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
p-value   0.195   0.732   0.884   0.729   0.007   0.339  
Observations   146   146   146   146   146   146  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. Duration² denotes the square of Duration. 4. P-value refers to conditional p-value of Fem estimated 
by LIML.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table A5: Robustness check: do trends matter? (I)  
Female Legislators   General Public Services   Defense   Health  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   4.459   -   2.380   -   -.218   -   .274   -  
   (1.780)**      (.922)**      (.601)      (.446)     
Party Quotas   -   5.593   -   1.506   -   -.406   -   .247  
      (1.707)***      (.791)*      (.576)      (.447)  
Legal Quotas   -   3.018   -   2.232   -   .536   -   -.463  
      (2.463)      (1.251)*      (.498)      (.510)  
Trend   1.684   1.575   0.079   -0.063   -0.419   -0.512   0.386   0.444  
   (1.301)   (1.433)   (.981)   (.976)   (.514)   (.515)   (.256)   (.281)  
Duration   0.456   0.419   -0.019   0.049   0.004   0.022   -0.027   -0.025  
   (.306)   (.333)   (.157)   (.167)   (.137)   (.149)   (.075)   (.081)  
DRGDP   0.493   0.264   1.570   1.717   0.701   0.784   0.069   0.019  
   (2.835)   (2.973)   (2.246)   (2.302)   (1.226)   (1.267)   (.486)   (.494)  
R²   0.82   0.83   0.65   0.64   0.66   0.66   0.66   0.66  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184   189   184  
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(continued) 
Education   Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
Dependent Variable  
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Quotas   -.030   -   -.441   -   1.832   -   1.246   -  
   (.570)      (.350)      (1.158)      (.558)**     
Party Quotas   -   -.281   -   -.511   -   1.210   -   1.325  
      (.558)      (.331)      (1.075)      (.583)**  
Legal Quotas   -   .546   -   .143   -   1.978   -   .131  
      (.565)      (.285)      (1.512)      (.704)  
Trend   -0.026   -0.148   0.161   0.103   -3.075   -3.310   0.185   0.169  
   (.347)   (.331)   (.176)   (.183)   (1.514)**   (1.599)**   (.428)   (.430)  
Duration   0.023   0.062   -0.026   -0.013   0.358   0.444   0.117   0.137  
   (.099)   (.091)   (.071)   (.074)   (.294)   (.322)   (.150)   (.165)  
DRGDP   0.646   0.679   0.510   0.544   3.521   3.562   0.228   0.132  
   (.675)   (.686)   (.482)   (.481)   (2.656)   (2.725)   (1.297)   (1.321)  
R²   0.7   0.7   0.55   0.55   0.71   0.71   0.86   0.86  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184   189   184  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. 4. Country and time dummies are included.  Li-Ju Chen, Do Gender Quotas Influence Women’s Representation and Policies? 
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Table A6: Robustness check: do trends matter? (II)  
General Public Services   Defense   Health   Education  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   .534   .334   -.049   -.038   .062   .017   -.007   -.018  
   (.256)**   (.142)**   (.113)   (.087)   (.086)   (.068)   (.107)   (.079)  
Trend   0.094   1.158   -0.412   -0.500   -0.672   -0.416   -0.420   -0.371  
   (1.637)   (1.135)   (.775)   (.661)   (.781)   (.703)   (.923)   (.805)  
Duration   -0.263   -0.121   0.026   0.023   -0.055   -0.020   0.026   0.055  
   (.222)   (.155)   (.143)   (.149)   (.083)   (.075)   (.113)   (.097)  
DRGDP   1.307   1.513   0.725   0.733   0.038   0.063   0.649   0.626  
   (1.915)   (1.844)   (1.019)   (1.037)   (.436)   (.421)   (.591)   (.578)  
IV                          
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184   189   184  
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(continued) 
Housing   Economic Affairs   Social Welfare  
 
(1)   (2)   (1)   (2)   (1)   (2)  
Fem   -.099   -.072   .411   .277   .279   .210  
   (.070)   (.050)   (.245)*   (.167)   (.122)**   (.081)***  
Trend   0.302   0.162   -4.093   -3.395   -2.247   -1.881  
   (.598)   (.510)   (1.780)**   (1.483)**   (1.054)**   (.968)*  
Duration   0.019   0.009   0.171   0.301   -0.011   0.061  
   (.084)   (.079)   (.253)   (.240)   (0.162)   (.162)  
DRGDP   0.559   0.528   3.318   3.381   0.090   0.124  
   (.470)   (.439)   (2.170)   (2.144)   (1.049)   (1.044)  
IV                    
 Gender quotas   Y   -   Y   -   Y   -  
 Party & Legal quotas   -   Y   -   Y   -   Y  
Observations   189   184   189   184   189   184  
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. 
Duration and DRGDP refer to the first difference of year and real GDP per capita, respectively. 4. Country and time dummies are included.  